Zaman ilgəyi və ya Anastasiya Romanovnanın postmodern qayıdışı

Zaman haqqda xəyala dalmışdımki fikir evimin qapısı döyüldü.Həqiqət yenə qapımda idi.Dediki dostunun dediyi zaman ilgəyi elmi dildə xronoanamalogiya deyilən iddia düzdü.Sual elədimki bunu mənə izah edə bilərsən.Cavab verdiki buyur Murad.
Qısa bir səyahətə çıxdıq çərxi fələk gətirdi bolşevik inqilabının olduğu vaxta və orda qaçan iki mühün insanın yanına.Uşaqları tanımadım.Dövran tez dəyişdi.Başqa zaman və məkan.Əsilzadə görünüşlü bir xanım.Tərcümə ilə məşğul idi.Yarım saat sonra piano arxasına keçdi bəstələdiyi musiqni ifa elədi.Notlara yenidən baxdı bəzi düzəlişləri etdi.Qapı döyüldü bir balaca uşaq içəri daxil oldu.Ağız açıb yalnız bir söz soruşa bildim bura haradı?Cavab verildiki Alyaskaya yaxınıq.Birdən Divardakı rəsm gözümə sataşdı və heyrətə gətirdi
-Bu rus Çarı ikinci ...(Sözüm ağzımda qaldı)
-Həəəəə.Bu da Anastasiyadı.
 Geri dönürük.Güman buduki Ananstasiyanın hazırki dövrdəki zühurunu görməlidik.İnsnaın yenidən qayıdışı barəd elmdə dində kifayət qədər danışılmışdı.Murad zaman zaman bu ağır mövzualrı cəsarətlə araşdırmış.Axırda dinin ,fəlsəfənin,elmin sintezinin tezislərini işşləyib hazırlamışdı.Ruhun təzahürlərini onları geri gətriməyi və s elmlərini qapısını döymə cəsaərətini tapmış fəqət sona qədər gedə bilməmişdi.Zaman təkrarlanması və sürətlənməsi fikrini ilk dəfə orta məktəbdə demişdi lakin ona gülmüşdülər.İndi imkan vardıkı gördüklərini hər kəslə paylaşsın.Yanındakı yoldaşı bu sualı verdi
-Anastasiya Romanovnanın varlğı barədə hələdə təraddüdlər var.Hər kəsə maraqlı mövzudu.Amma bu zamanda təzahür edibsə ilk yaşam dönəmində nəsə böyük iş görüb.Bu iş nədiki?İndi kimin vücudundadı?
-Anastasiya Romanovna elə bir iş başlatdıkı onu müasir dövrdə çox adam edir və haqlı nüfuz sahibi olur,tanınır.Amma Anastasiya bu etdiyini əbədi olaraq materyalist anlaya bilməyəcək.Müasir dövrdə ilk dəfə elita mənsubu xanımların cəmiyyətə bütünləşməsinin əasını qoydu.Fikir verdinsə musiqi bəstəlyirdi,tərcümə edirdi o uşaqda onun tələbəsi idi.O çox insanda təzahür edib.Səni isə ən sadəsinin yanına aparıram.Anastasiyanın həmişə xəyal edib olması istədiyi amma heç cürə ola bilmədiyi bir insanın yanına.
  Zaman keçir və Bakıdayam.Xarici Dillər Universitetinə gəlib bir otağın qarşısnda dayandıq.Qapının üzərində  Tədris işləri üzrə dekan müvani yazılı lövhə asılmışdı.İçəri keçdik Bizi heç kim görmürdü və içəridə bir otaq və o qız.Bayaqki piaono çalan qız.Sadəcə bir az daha qarayanız olub.Murad bu qiza bir daha diqqətlə baxdı.Bu qızı tanıyırdı.Bu qız Fatimə idi.Kübar təbiətli,ziyalı və sakit bir insan idi.Həmdə müəllimə idi.O da tərcümələr edirdi.Musiqiyədə meyli vardı.Həyatını elə qurmuşduki elə bil ancaq öyrənməyə öyrətməyə doğulub.Səhnə möhtəşəm idi.Məchul şəhzadəni bütün dünya axtarırdı amma bu insan gözlərinin qarşısında işıq saçırdı.Demək Fatimənin varlığındakı məna bu imiş.Bu səhnənin sonsuza qədər davam etməsini istəyridi Murad.Məhcul şəhzadəni bütün varlığı təmsil edən Fatiməni bütün ömrünü izləməyədə razı idi.Səslizliyi,baxışındakı kübarlıq,üzündəki o ilahi ideya,saflığı hətta tərcümə etdiyi mətnə baxışı belə eynən bayaq gördüyü məchul şəhzadəyə bənzəyirdi.Demək İlahi bu sadə insanlardan o məchul şəhzadənin başlatdığı

işə mükəlləf bu qız imiş.Sadəcə heyrət və iftixar.

APOLOGETIC MODERNITY PART I

Abstract

What is the conceptual status of modernity in the Muslim world? Scholars describe Muslim attempts at appropriating this European idea as being either derivative or incomplete, with a few calling for multiple modernities to allow modern Islam some autonomy. Such approaches are critical of the apologetic way in which Muslims have grappled with the idea of modernity, the purity and autonomy of the concept of which is apparently compromised by its derivative and incomplete appropriation. None have attended to the conceptual status of this apologetic itself, though it is certainly the most important element in Muslim debates on the modern. This essay considers the adoption of modernity as an idea among Muslim intellectuals in nineteenth-century India, a place in which some of the earliest and most influential debates on Islam’s modernity occurred. It argues that Muslim apologetics created a modernity whose rejection of purity and autonomy permitted it a distinctive conceptual form.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, Muslims have been deeply concerned with the idea of modernity and its place in Islamic thought. In the Muslim world the term modernity itself was taken from languages like English, French or German and translated into some version of two Arabic roots describing the contemporary and the novel, for instance the abstract nouns contemporaneousness (asriyyat) and novelty (jadidiyyat), both nineteenth-century neologisms. These words still retain the memory of their translation, so that Muslim debates on the modern continue to occur within narrative spaces bounded by markers like East and West, Islam and Christianity.

Was this language of modernity wholly or partially foreign? Was it a sign of Christian or European dominance? Was there anything neutral, universal or Islamic about the modern? It was questions of these kinds that characterized Muslim debates on modernity, with markers like the East and West or Islam and Christianity, which in European thought tended to define the boundaries of the modern in a peripheral and merely descriptive way, becoming conceptually central in the Muslim world and historically grounded in imperialism. As a result Muslim debates over modernity generally took the form of defining a relationship, whether of acceptance, rejection or compromise, between East and West, Islam and Christianity. The dictated character of this debate, however, made the emergence of a systematic modernism in control of its own terms of argument impossible, for Muslims were neither able to participate in European discussions about their modernity, nor to be acknowledged in them, even if these discussions formed the basis of their own sense of the modern. That is to say, the modernist debate among Muslims continued to revolve around historical oppositions that could not enter into any real, let alone systematic, relationship, so that relations between East and West, Muslim and Christian, were thought of in partial and fragmentary ways, like attempts to enter into conversation with someone speaking a different language. The closeness of its thinking to European thought, together with its inability to engage with and integrate the latter intellectually, made Muslim modernism essentially apologetic. And it is the partial and unsystematic nature of this apologetic modernity that I want to explore in the context of colonial India, if only to find in it something more than intellectual and political limitation. After all, the very weakness, incompleteness or derivative nature of Muslim apologetic needs to be explained in light of the manifest intelligence of its practitioners. Moreover, Islamic modernism provides the intellectual and political foundations for Muslim movements even today, which continue to rely upon its apologetic and unsystematic ways.

Scholars of modern Islam have all noticed its apologetic character but have spent little time attending to it. Most dismiss this tradition as being a sign merely of Islam's incomplete modernity and a product of the West's overwhelming might. Whether or not these scholars think Islam will survive the shock of this ever-renewed encounter with some sort of Euro-American modernity, they are united in seeing Muslim apologetic in negative terms as a lack and an absence whose positive alternative is naturally provided by the West. This is true even when the scholar concerned is a critic of European or American modernity who bemoans the passing of Islam's traditional world.¹ Indeed such sympathetic scholars despise Muslim modernism even more for sacrificing what they see as a glorious history to the requirements of an industrial age. But sometimes these scholars move beyond the sorry tale of Islam's incomplete modernity, and, sometimes inadvertently, provide its apologetic with the rudiments of ontology. A good example is the following sentence from Fazlur Rahman's book Islam and Modernity:

[Islamic] modernism could afford to be partial and unsystematic and could even afford to be slow—for at the theoretical level it was mostly a “defense of Islam” and hence chose to respond to those problems that the western critics had raised, while at the practical level the urgency for a speedy and systematic reform was often difficult to feel owing to the absence of ultimate and concrete responsibilities for problem solving.²

Rahman, himself a celebrated exponent of Islamic modernism, traces its origins to the period of European dominance in the nineteenth century and to the emergence throughout the Muslim world of efforts at grappling with the fact of Europe's intellectual and political hegemony. It is in this context, Rahman thinks, that these efforts coalesced in a movement he calls Islamic modernism, which he defines in terms of its partialities and unsystematic character: a movement consisting on the one hand in a defense of Muslim beliefs and practices against European criticism, and on the other in an attack on these same beliefs and practices in the terms of European criticism.

Rahman traces the origins of this interest in modernity to the questions that Europeans began to ask about Islam in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. What, for instance, was the allegiance of Muslims to the Caliph residing in Constantinople? This was the earliest form of a Western concern with pan-Islamic loyalty. Under what conditions was jihad against Christian rulers incumbent upon Muslims? This was the earliest form of a Western concern with war as an Islamic obligation. As Rahman shows, such questions, which served to differentiate East from West, Islam from Christianity, were also taken up by nineteenth-century Muslim writers, who repudiated European theories about pan-Islamic or jihad politics and tried to reform Islam itself away from such injunctions in the name of modernity. But their sense of modernity was cobbled together out of disparate European ideals like civility, rationality and the like, without any attempt to develop a coherent theory of the modern. For Muslim ideas of Islam's modernity were neither independent nor systematic, but plotted according to European concerns, themselves partial in every sense of the word.

Instead of following a well-trodden path in bemoaning the derivative or incomplete character of this modernity, one that did not control the terms of its own debate, Rahman describes its apparent weakness as a luxury. In the period of colonial dominance, he claims, attempts to modernize Islam in the way of, say, reforming its canon law could afford to be partial and unsystematic because Muslims could not control or change the society in which they lived. Their interest in pan-Islamic or jihad politics was largely theoretical, so were their attempts remake Muslim societies in modern terms. If their dependence on European categories of modernity made Muslim modernists partial, in Rahman's formulation, their inability to put into effect a project for Islam's modernization made them unsystematic as well. Taken together, both these factors added up to a sense and practice of Muslim modernity that I am arguing was fundamentally apologetic in nature. But it is precisely this apologetic modernism, dismissed by others as mere weakness, which Fazlur Rahman describes as a luxury, holding that the circumstances of European domination afforded Muslims the opportunity to become modern partially, unsystematically and even slowly.

I shall return to what exactly the luxury of this apologetic might consist of, but I want to suggest here that the fragmentary nature of such thought also allowed its practitioners to be modern in curious and not-quite-European ways. In what follows I want to argue two points. In the first place I want to suggest that the very “weakness”, or what Rahman calls its luxurious character, allowed Muslims to think of modernity in intellectual rather than political terms, and that this in itself gave the advocates of modernity some degree of autonomy. Thus while the British in India, for example, thought that pan-Islamic loyalty or jihad posed questions that were as much political as anything else, Muslim modernists were able to regard them as essentially theoretical because they pertained to the workings of a world over which they exercised no political control. For modernist politics were fragmented, made up in equal measure of remnants from the precolonial past (like dealing with religious institutions but no longer civil ones) and cast-offs from the colonial present (like being appointed to minor administrative positions but having no say in the imperial order).

The second point I want to make is that this apologetic modernism was produced in the name of Islam as a new historical entity, designating a moral community transcending the particularity of royal, clerical or mystical authority. We know that it was only during the nineteenth century that the word Islam, of rare occurrence in the Quran and premodern Muslim texts in general, came to be used as a category of identity embracing all Muslim practices.³ Before this it had been used mostly to relate theological categories, such as obedience (islam) and faith (iman), to categories of Muslim identity such as religion (din), sect (firqa), school (mazhab) and mystical order (tariqa), to say nothing of the more or less profane identifications of royal authority. There was no idea of Islam as a totality of beliefs and actions that not only transcended the remit of specific authorities like those of clerics, mystics and kings, but could also become its own authority as an independent historical actor designating a new kind of moral community.

One might even say that “Islam” and the question of its modernity were born at the same time, insofar as this Islam emerges in modernist debates as a historical agent and authority in its own right, constituting the totality of Muslim beliefs and practices as a community with its own volition, ethos or spirit.⁴ But for Islam to have a spirit it needed to possess a body as well, and this was provided by its culture (tahzib) or civilization (tamaddun), within which all prior forms of Muslim identification were made to disappear. The cultural body of Islam, in other words, produced the spirit that governed it, whether this was conceived in the name of Montesquieu, Hegel or Feuerbach. While I shall not be dealing with the question of Islam's spirit in this essay, I do want to point out that in addition to spiriting Muslim authority away, it constituted a radically new locution. It would not have been possible to talk about the spirit of Islam before the nineteenth century, because Islam itself had not yet come to exist as a singular culture or civilization, the sum total of Muslim beliefs and practices.

By claiming that their weakness allowed for an intellectual rather than political approach to the question of modernity, I do not mean to say that Muslim modernists in colonial India had no community-building agenda, only that the lack of political responsibility permitted them a thoughtful reflection upon the notion of authority. And this was done in the universalistic terms of Islam as a new category of identification that ended up displacing particular authorities altogether. I want to claim that this reflection upon authority in the name of a new Islam went beyond the purely instrumental concerns of these modernists to constitute a specific way of thinking, one that has outlived them and that survives to this day.

Modernism and Politics

Following the global catastrophe of the Second World War, the triumphalist history of modernism began to be challenged. There was mounting evidence that the modernist enterprise was failing.

The tenets of the movement, its belief in progress, freedom, and equality, had been sustained from the outset by artists and intellectuals, and embraced by those who reaped the material benefits it brought.

But now there was cause to question these beliefs. After two hundred years of concerted effort, we ask what has been accomplished.

It is true many advances have been made in science, technology, medicine, education, suffrage, life expectancy, and physical comfort, but is the world a better place for all that? Has the modernist experiment resulted in the creation of a better human society? For an increasing number of people the answer is no.

For some, problems in the pursuit of modernism were already apparent early in the 20th century. The senseless, mechanized slaughter of the First World War showed that modernism's faith in scientific and technological progress as the path to a better world was tragically misguided.

For the Dada artists, the ‘Great War’ signaled the failure of all modernist art. It may be claimed that Dada marks the emergence of a post–modernist cast of mind.

In the period between World War One and World War Two progressive modernism continued to pursue its goals, but now often in association with other forces.

Progressive artists actively supported political revolution. Pablo Picasso, for example, joined the communist party in 1944, as did many other artists.

The Russian Revolution had seemed at the time, and for a long time after, to be the answer to the progressive modernist's dream.

Marxist communism was the boldest attempt yet to create a better society, adopting not a political democracy but an economic democracy which aimed at achieving economic equality. Communism offered the vision of universal freedom predicated on the freedom of ideas.

Progressive modernist artists, in the imaginative freedom of their works, exemplified or encouraged this freedom.

In 1932, however, under Josef Stalin, this freedom was sharply curtailed and modern art, such as it was, was forced to adopt a more conservative form, known as Socialist Realism.

The suppression of progressive modernist art in favour of a propagandistic Socialist Realism also occurred at the other end of the political spectrum in Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany.

Hitler, too, had wanted to create a new and better society, but his method of achieving it horrified the world. Whereas progressive modernism sought to improve the lot of all humankind, the Nazis, utilizing ideas derived from social Darwinism, employed eugenics (the science of improving human hereditary) with the aim of establishing a hierarchically superior and racially pure ‘master race’ (Herrenrasse).

Humans who were considered racially inferior or were deemed medically, mentally, or physically defective, disabled, impaired, or incurable, or otherwise regarded as morally or socially deviant, degenerate, weak, or impure, were targeted, at first, for euthanasia or sterilization, but later, upon being identified as possessing ‘life unworthy of life’ (Lebensunwertes Leben) were simply killed.

The Second World War and the Nazi holocaust, we now realize, dealt a mortal blow to modernism. It shattered the modernist dream and defiled the impulse that sustained modern art.

In 1949, the philosopher Theodor Adorno commented that ‘writing poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric.’ After the Second World War, optimism in the future was difficult to sustain. And to make matters worse, with the advent of the Cold War and the constant threat of nuclear destruction, any sort of future looked doubtful.

Having rejected tradition and the past many years ago, and now with the future no longer the goal of artistic effort, many artists turned with obvious distress to the present and focused their attention on contemporary popular culture.

Pop artists could still appear progressive under these circumstances, contributing a critique of middle–class ideals and the superficial materialism of the American dream. What was happening in effect, though, was that modernist art itself was under attack as a middle–class ideal.

The comment made by the military officer in Vietnam that his platoon had to destroy a Vietnamese village in order to save it (i.e. from the Vietcong and Communism), seems to have been applied to art; it became necessary to destroy art, or at least the modernist understanding of it, in order to save it.

With it the purpose of modern art began to evaporate. The feeling for some was that modernism had played itself out and was now floundering and directionless.

In recent years, progressive modernism has seemed intent not on defining a future but in destroying the values of the present, especially as they pertained to modern art.

While progressive artists have remained ostensibly hostile to prevailing systems of authority, this position is no longer at all clear.

Conceptual art in the late 1960s and early 1970s concerned itself with ‘concepts’ or ‘ideas’ to the neglect of more traditional concerns with materials, aesthetics, or even simple skills.

In 1967, the American artist Sol LeWitt explained in an article ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’ in the magazine Artforum:

In conceptual art the idea or concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair.

Conceptual art quickly established itself as another affront to established middle–class values and the public’s hostility toward it was intense.

But conceptualism appeared to step beyond the limits established by modernism.

The artist and writer Victor Burgin has described conceptualism as a revolt against modernism. This may not seem apparent, because, true to form, orthodox art history has managed to assimilate it into the seamless fabric of ‘art history’ while stifling its radicalism.

Nonetheless, conceptualism deliberately was an art that no aesthetic formalism could hope to embrace. It was an attempt to place art beyond all limitations and definitions, to break the stranglehold of middle–class formalist art history and criticism.

The process of ‘making’ and the manipulation of materials was given precedence, with the result that the final object became secondary, almost incidental, and often temporary.

Conceptualism became an umbrella term (in an attempt to define and contain) under which were lumped together a whole range of difficult–to–classify art such as Performance and Earth Art. Conceptual artists produced work that was difficult if not impossible to classify according to the old system.

Art in the latter half of the 20th century deliberately placed itself beyond the limits of control.

Today, art historians and critics — we might call them the art police — throw up their hands in dismay in the face of contemporary art. They have reached their limit — they can no longer absorb contemporary art into the system, patterns of order can no longer be applied.

The critical apparatus of control has broken down; traditional art theory and traditional art history have failed along with modernism.

Ağaların müəllimin anazlinə alternativ.

Ağalar Məmmədov mənim Turizm institutunnda müəllimim olub.Zaman zaman işlətdiyi bir söz vardı bacarısız mənədə qarşı çıxın bir az cəsarətli olun,belə gənc olmaz və s.Məndə bu məsləhəti yerinə yetirəcəm.Ağalar müəllimin yaxın günlərdə xəbər saytlarının birində  "Üçüncü gücə təklif" adlı məqaləsi dərc olundu və məqalə analitik xarakter daşıyırdı həmçinin kifayət qədər marağa səbəb oldu.Məqalədə çıxan nəticə qısaca belədi.
   Ölkə vətəndaşlarının əksəsəriyyəti apaolitik laqeyddi
   Problem ikiyə vururlub.Klassik müxalifətə siyasi iqtidarı vermək olmaz
   Bu proseslərin fonunda aktiv islamçılara gün doğur.
   Alternativ müxalifət formalaşdırmalıdı.
   Aktivləşən islamçılar onalrın şüuru fonu ölkəyə yaxşı heçnə gətirməyəcək.
  Dindarların statistikası bizdə yoxdu və onları kateqoriyalara ayıra bilmirik və bu faciədir.

Ağalar müəəlimin gəldiyi nəticələrinin ilk iki bəndinin təzahürlərinin gətirəcəyi probelərinin dərkini anlayıb razılaşıram.Amma ondan sonra sadalanan nəticələr və məqalədə təsvir etdiyi sosium natamamdır.Ümümiyyətlə analiz natamamdır.Və oxuduqca hiss olunurki proseslərin gedişini diqqətlə izləyib lakin mahiyyətini düzgün dərk edilməyib və təzahürləri daha ciddiyə alıb.Və hadisələri kalssik modern nəzəriyyələrin yaratdığı təsəvvür ampulasından izah edib.Halbuki məsələr Ağalar müəllimin fikriləşdiyi kimi deyil.İlk öncə başa düşülməlidirki moderləşmə ağılasığmaz bir sürətlə dəyişir və bunun bir presidenti yoxdu.

Dəyişim konkret inkişaf dinamikası var  amma ümüm qanunuyğunluğu yoxdu.Son on ildə gedən proseslər və cəmiyyətin dəyişim anlayışı  mövcud nəzəriyyələr çərçivəsindən tam izah edilə bilmir mahiyyət gizli qalır.Dəyişim Qərdən Şərqə doğru meyillənib bəz hallarda yerini dəyişib.Məhz bu proseslərin fonunda ölkəmizdəki siyasi müxalifətin israrla məsələyə proqresiv deyil romantik ampulada yanaşması dediyiniz kimi problemi ikiyə vurub.
 Bundan əlavə islamçıların statistikası və təsnifatının aparılamsı görəsən kimə lazımdı? İnanc intim bir mövzudu və burda söz haqqı inasnın özündədi və sərbəstdi,konstisuonal hüquqdu.İslam din kimi cəmiyyətdə bəzi haidsələrə görə baxış prizması və reaksiya müəyyən etsədə ondan irəlliyə getmir.Sadəcə Ağalar müəllimi narahat edən məslənin nə olduğunu deyim.Moderləşmə ilk başda sekuryarlaşma,proqresivvləşmə,rasionallaşma ilə gedir.Bu gün Turkiyə,Misir,Əlcəzair və bu tip islami refleksin güclü olduğu ölkələrdə dnin özündə bir növ proqressivləşmə gedir.(Misirdəki Hicab söhbəti,bir misirli islam alimi islamda sadəcə normal örtünmənin gəldiyinin bürünmə olmadığı barədə qlamqallı fətva vermişdi.)Artıq bu ölkədə ciddi siyasi və sosial institutlar islamın proqressivləşmənin tezislərini hazırlayırlar.

Artıq bunun ilkin əsasını cəmiyyətə təqdim ediblər.Məsələnin mahiyyəti odurki azadlığın və seçim azadlığının islami çərçivədə vüsət alması cəmiyyəti başqa formaya salacaq sadəcə Ağalar müəllim islamiyyətlə modernləşməni yan yana təsəvvür edə bilmir.Məsəsləyə yuxarıda dediyim kimi əvvəlki nəzriyyələr çərçivəsindən baxır və porseslərin mahiyyətini analmır və təzahürlərini facəvi sayır halbuki bu prosesinin başlamasının gedişatının rotasını cəmiyyət təyin edir.Və məsələnin nəhayətində Ağalar müəllim özü bəzi qrup islamçıların götürdüyü strategiyanı bəyənir və nümünə göstərir.Ölkədə üçüncü güc yaranmayacaq ən azı klassik müxalifət imkan verməyəcək.Üçüncü güc deyilən sosial qrupun alternativ mahiyyəti yoxdur.Çünki əgər elə bir güclü sosial qruplaşma varsa çoxdan siyasi elitanın tərkib hissəsinə çevrilmişdi.Alternativ etirazçılar deyilən kəsim sadəcə təqlidlə məşğuldu kimlərisə,nələrisə,hansısa modelləri,hansısa nəzəriyyələri təqlid eləməklə məşğuldu.İşin içində bir öz yoxdu.
 NƏTİCƏ. Üçüncü güc abstark bir şeydi hələki xəyali olaraq təsəvvür edilə bilər lakin olması mümkünsüzdür olduğu gün hakim siyasi elitanın tərkibinə daxil olacaq etirazçı olmayacaq.Maraqldıdkı demokratiyanın təzahürlərinin biridə cəmiyyətinin özünə inkişaf yolu seçir milli ideologiya yaradır milli maraq və s formlaşdırır.Cəmiyyət burda özü iştirak edir.İşdən gələn inkişaf ünsürləri inkar olunur(din.milliklik,mentalitet və s)amma kenarda neyisə təqlid etmək demokratiyanın balansına yazırlır bu tamamilə ədalətsizdi.Proseslər cəmiyyətin marağnda necədisə elə inkişaf edir.